

INFS 767 Fall 2001

The RBAC96 Model

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AUTHORIZATION, TRUST AND RISK

- ❖ Information security is fundamentally about managing
 - authorization and
 - trustso as to manage risk

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
SOLUTIONS

- ❖ OM-AM
- ❖ RBAC
- ❖ PKI
- ❖ and others

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THE OM-AM WAY



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
LAYERS AND LAYERS

- ❖ Multics rings
- ❖ Layered abstractions
- ❖ Waterfall model
- ❖ Network protocol stacks
- ❖ OM-AM

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OM-AM AND MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL (MAC)



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OM-AM AND DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL (DAC)

What?

Owner-based discretion

numerous

numerous

ACLs, Capabilities, etc

How?

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OM-AM AND ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC)

What?

Policy neutral

RBAC96

user-pull, server-pull, etc.

certificates, tickets, PACs, etc.

How?

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ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC)

- ❖ **A user's permissions are determined by the user's roles**
 - > rather than identity or clearance
 - > roles can encode arbitrary attributes
- ❖ **multi-faceted**
- ❖ **ranges from very simple to very sophisticated**

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WHAT IS THE POLICY IN RBAC?

- ❖ **RBAC is a framework to help in articulating policy**
- ❖ **The main point of RBAC is to facilitate security management**

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RBAC SECURITY PRINCIPLES

- ❖ **least privilege**
- ❖ **separation of duties**
- ❖ **separation of administration and access**
- ❖ **abstract operations**

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RBAC96 IEEE Computer Feb. 1996

- ❖ **Policy neutral**
- ❖ **can be configured to do MAC**
 - > roles simulate clearances (ESORICS 96)
- ❖ **can be configured to do DAC**
 - > roles simulate identity (RBAC98)

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WHAT IS RBAC?

- ❖ multidimensional
- ❖ open ended
- ❖ ranges from simple to sophisticated

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
RBAC CONUNDRUM

- ❖ turn on all roles all the time
- ❖ turn on one role only at a time
- ❖ turn on a user-specified subset of roles

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
RBAC96 FAMILY OF MODELS



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RBAC0



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PERMISSIONS

- ❖ **Primitive permissions**
 - > read, write, append, execute
- ❖ **Abstract permissions**
 - > credit, debit, inquiry

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PERMISSIONS

- ❖ **System permissions**
 - > Auditor
- ❖ **Object permissions**
 - > read, write, append, execute, credit, debit, inquiry

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PERMISSIONS

- ❖ **Permissions are positive**
- ❖ **No negative permissions or denials**
 - negative permissions and denials can be handled by constraints
- ❖ **No duties or obligations**
 - outside scope of access control

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ROLES AS POLICY

- ❖ **A role brings together**
 - a collection of users and
 - a collection of permissions
- ❖ **These collections will vary over time**
 - A role has significance and meaning beyond the particular users and permissions brought together at any moment

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ROLES VERSUS GROUPS

- ❖ **Groups are often defined as**
 - a collection of users
- ❖ **A role is**
 - a collection of users and
 - a collection of permissions
- ❖ **Some authors define role as**
 - a collection of permissions

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USERS

- ❖ **Users are**
 - human beings or
 - other active agents
- ❖ **Each individual should be known as exactly one user**

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USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT

- ❖ **A user can be a member of many roles**
- ❖ **Each role can have many users as members**

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SESSIONS

- ❖ **A user can invoke multiple sessions**
- ❖ **In each session a user can invoke any subset of roles that the user is a member of**

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PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT

- ❖ A permission can be assigned to many roles
- ❖ Each role can have many permissions

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
MANAGEMENT OF RBAC

- ❖ Option 1:
USER-ROLE-ASSIGNMENT and PERMISSION-ROLE ASSIGNMENT can be changed only by the chief security officer
- ❖ Option 2:
Use RBAC to manage RBAC

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
RBAC1



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
HIERARCHICAL ROLES



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
HIERARCHICAL ROLES



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
PRIVATE ROLES



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
EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY



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
EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY



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
EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY



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EXAMPLE ROLE HIERARCHY




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RBAC3

ROLE HIERARCHIES



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CONSTRAINTS

❖ Mutually Exclusive Roles

- Static Exclusion: The same individual can never hold both roles
- Dynamic Exclusion: The same individual can never hold both roles in the same context

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CONSTRAINTS

❖ Mutually Exclusive Permissions

- **Static Exclusion:** The same role should never be assigned both permissions
- **Dynamic Exclusion:** The same role can never hold both permissions in the same context

CONSTRAINTS

❖ Cardinality Constraints on User-Role Assignment

- **At most k users can belong to the role**
- **At least k users must belong to the role**
- **Exactly k users must belong to the role**

CONSTRAINTS

❖ Cardinality Constraints on Permissions-Role Assignment

- **At most k roles can get the permission**
- **At least k roles must get the permission**
- **Exactly k roles must get the permission**