

On the Relationship between Finite Domain ABAM and PreUCON_A

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- **Introduction**
- **ABAM model**
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➤ **ABAM:**

- ❖ HRU + Attributes
- ❖ Test for and modify attribute values
- ❖ Set of attributes is finite

➤ **PreUCON_A**

- ❖ Sub-model of UCON
- ❖ Test for and modify attribute values prior access
- ❖ Set of attributes is finite

➤ Components:

- ❖ Subjects (S) and Objects (O)
- ❖ Attributes and Attribute Tuples
- ❖ Rights (R) and Access Matrix
- ❖ Attribute Predicates (P)
- ❖ Primitive Operations
- ❖ Commands

	$s_1: ATT(s_1)$	$s_2: ATT(s_2)$	$o_1: ATT(o_1)$	$o_2: ATT(o_2)$
$s_1: ATT(s_1)$		{parent}	{read, write}	
$s_2: ATT(s_2)$			{read}	

ABAM access matrix [*]

* Zhang, X., Li, Y., Nalla, D.: An attribute-based access matrix model. In: the 2005 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, pp. 359-363 (2005).

➤ ABAM Commands:

- Parameters (entities with possibly new attribute values)
- Conditions
- A sequence of primitive operations.

Command $\alpha_i(X_1:ATT(X_1), X_2:ATT(X_2), \dots, X_k:ATT(X_k))$
If $r_1 \in [X_{s1}, X_{o1}] \wedge r_2 \in [X_{s2}, X_{o2}] \wedge \dots \wedge r_m \in [X_{sm}, X_{om}] \wedge P_1 \wedge P_2 \wedge \dots \wedge P_n$
then $op_1; op_2; \dots; op_l$
end

	$s_1: ATT(s_1)$	$s_2: ATT(s_2)$	$o_1: ATT(o_1)$	$o_2: ATT(o_2)$
$s_1: ATT(s_1)$		{parent}	{read, write}	
$s_2: ATT(s_2)$			{read}	

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➤ Three components:

- ❖ An object schema OS_{Δ}
 - ❖ $OS_{\Delta} = (a_1 : \Omega_1, a_2 : \Omega_2, \dots, a_n : \Omega_n)$
- ❖ A set of finite usage rights $UR = \{r_1, r_2, \dots, r_m\}$
- ❖ A set of usage control commands $\{UC_1, UC_2, \dots, UC_m\}$

➤ PreUCON_A Commands:

Non-Creating Commands	Creating Commands
Command-Name_r(s, o) PreCondition: $f_b(s, o) \rightarrow \{yes, no\};$ PreUpdate: $s.a_{i_1} := f_1, a_{i_1}(s, o);$... $s.a_{i_p} := f_1, a_{i_p}(s, o);$ $o.a_{j_1} := f_2, a_{j_1}(s, o);$... $o.a_{j_q} := f_2, a_{j_q}(s, o);$	Command-Name_r(s) PreCondition: $f_b(s) \rightarrow \{yes, no\};$ PreUpdate: create o; $s.a_{i_1} := f_1, a_{i_1}(s);$... $s.a_{i_p} := f_1, a_{i_p}(s);$ $o.a_1 := f_2, a_1(s);$... $o.a_n := f_2, a_n(s);$

Table 1. PreUCON_A commands

➤ **Challenges:**

- Condition Part in PreUCON_A permits arbitrary computable Boolean functions
- Condition Part in ABAM only permits propositional logic formulas

➤ **Finite domain results in:**

- PreUCON_A can be computed for all possible attribute values of s and o
- The results can be “compiled” into multiple ABAM commands.

➤ **Example:** Let the object schema $OS_{\Delta} = [a_1 : \{1, 2\}_1, a_2 : \{2, 3\}, a_3 : \{1, 2, 3\}]$ and usage rights $UR = \{update\}$. The initial values for s and o attributes are $[1, 2, 3]$ and $[2, 3, 1]$ respectively for $[a_1, a_2, a_3]$. The PreUCon_A update command is in the left side, and the table shows the possible ABAM commands:

Command $update(s, o)$
PreCondition: $s.a_1 \leq 2 \vee o.a_2 \leq 3$
PreUpdate: $o.a_3 := \max(s.a_3, o.a_3);$

Updating to value 1	Updating to value 2	Updating to value 3
Command $update(s : ATT(s), o : ATT(o))$ if $s.a_1 \leq 2 \vee o.a_2 \leq 3 \wedge (s.a_3 = 1 \vee o.a_3 = 1)$	Command $update(s : ATT(s), o : ATT(o))$ if $s.a_1 \leq 2 \vee o.a_2 \leq 3 \wedge ((s.a_3 = 1 \wedge o.a_3 = 2) \vee (s.a_3 = 2 \wedge o.a_3 = 1))$	Command $update(s : ATT(s), o : ATT(o))$ if $s.a_1 \leq 2 \vee o.a_2 \leq 3 \wedge ((s.a_3 = 1 \wedge o.a_3 = 3) \vee (s.a_3 = 2 \wedge o.a_3 = 3) \vee (s.a_3 = 3 \wedge o.a_3 = 1) \vee (s.a_3 = 3 \wedge o.a_3 = 2) \vee (s.a_3 = 3 \wedge o.a_3 = 3))$
update attribute $o.a_3 = 1$ enter <i>update</i> into $[s, o];$ delete <i>update</i> from $[s, o];$ end	update attribute $o.a_3 = 2$ enter <i>update</i> into $[s, o];$ delete <i>update</i> from $[s, o];$ end	update attribute $o.a_3 = 3$ enter <i>update</i> into $[s, o];$ delete <i>update</i> from $[s, o];$ end

Table 2. Possible ABAM commands

- **Challenges of Reducing ABAM to PreUCON_A**
 - PreUCON_A command has the ability to grant a non-persistent right in each command
 - ABAM command has the power of granting one or more rights to the actor, maintaining the given rights in the corresponding cell of the actor, and permitting two or more parameters (more targets) in each command.
 - Unrestricted use of rights in ABAM will result in undecidable safety whereas PreUCON_A has decidable safety
- **Reducing ABAM to PreUCON_A is not possible**
- **Right-Less ABAM with Two Parameters (RL-ABAM2) is a restricted form of ABAM that can be reduced to PreUCON_A**

- RL-ABAM2 command is limited in terms:
 - Number of parameters
 - The if statement section
 - The existence of rights
- RL-ABAM2 command is defined as follows:

```
Command  $\alpha_i(X_1 : ATT(X_1), X_2 : ATT(X_2))$   
if  $p_1 \wedge p_2 \wedge \dots p_n$   
then  
 $op_1; op_2; \dots; op_l$  ;  
enter  $r_1$  into  $[X_1, X_2]$ ;  
delete  $r_1$  from  $[X_1, X_2]$ ;  
  
...  
enter  $r_k$  into  $[X_1, X_2]$ ;  
delete  $r_k$  from  $[X_1, X_2]$   
end
```

Given an RL-ABAM2 schema with the following components: objects $O_{RL-ABAM2}$, subjects $S_{RL-ABAM2}$, access rights $R_{RL-ABAM2} = \{r_1, \dots, r_k\}$, attributes tuple $ATT(o_i) = \langle a_1 = v_1, \dots, a_n = v_n \rangle$, where $o_i \in O_{RL-ABAM2}$, and a list of all attributes which are linked with their domains $G - V_{\{RL-ABAM2\}} = [a_1:V(a_1), \dots, a_i:V(a_i), \dots, a_n:V(a_n)]$, each RL-ABAM2 commands will have the following structure:

Command $\alpha_i (s_i : ATT(s_i), o_j : ATT(o_j))$
if $p_1 \wedge p_2 \wedge \dots p_n$
then
 create object $X2 : ATT(X2)$;
 update attribute $s_i.a_k = v'_i$;
 update attribute $o_i.a_s = v'_j$;
 enter r_i into $[s_i, o_j]$;
 delete r_i from $[s_i, o_j]$;
end

➤ The corresponding PreUCON_A components of the RL-ABAM2 schema are extended as follows:

- Entity in PreUCON_A are objects $O_{Pre_UCON_A}$
- $O_{Pre_UCON_A} = O_{RL-ABAM2} \cup O_{lock}$
- $S_{Pre_UCON_A} = S_{RL-ABAM2}$
- $UR_{Pre_UCON_A} = Command - R_{RL-ABAM2}$
- $Auxiliary - OS_{\Delta} = [lock:V(lock), type:V(type), R_to_select:V(R_to_select), position:V(position)]$
- $OS_{\Delta} = G - V_{\{RL-ABAM2\}} \cup Auxiliary - OS_{\Delta}$

The domain for each of these additional attributes is as follows: $V(lock) = \{0, 1\}$, $V(type) = \{ordinary, lock\}$, $V(R_to_select) = UR_{Pre_UCON_A}$, and $V(position) = \{1,2\}$. The initial values for the proposed attributes are set as follows: For all $o \in O_{RL-ABAM2}$: $o.type = ordinary$, $o.lock = 0$, $o.position = \phi$, and $o.R_to_select = \phi$. For O_{lock} : $O_{lock}.type = lock$, $O_{lock}.lock = 1$, $O_{lock}.position = \phi$, $O_{lock}.R_to_select = \phi$.

To apply a RL-ABAM2 command in PreUCON_A commands, a sequence of steps is introduced as follows:

1- Give a lock to the first parameter of the RL-ABAM2 command

```
Command get_lock ( $s_i : ATT(s_i), O\_lock : ATT(O\_lock)$ )
if  $s_i.type = ordinary \wedge O\_lock.type = lock \wedge s_i.lock = 0 \wedge O\_lock.lock = 1$ 
then
  update attribute  $s_i.lock = 1$ ;
  update attribute  $O\_lock.lock = 0$ ;
  update attribute  $s_i.position = 1$ ;
  update attribute  $s_i.R\_to\_select = UR_{Pre\_UCON_A}$ 
end
```

2- Decide the second parameter of the RL-ABAM2 command

```
Command pick_target( $s_i : ATT(s_i), o_j : ATT(o_j)$ )
if  $s_i.type = ordinary \wedge s_i.lock = 1 \wedge o_j.lock = ordinary \wedge s_i.position = 1 \wedge o_j.position = \phi$ 
then
  update attribute  $o_j.position = 2$ ;
end
```

3- Implement a sequence of PreUCON_A commands (depend on the number of the operation over rights in the body of an RL-ABAM2 command)

Command— $r_1(s_i, o_j)$

PreCondition: $fb(s_i, o_j) \wedge$
 $s_i.R_to_select = UR_{Pre_UCON_A} \wedge s_i.lock = 1$
 $\wedge s_i.position = 1 \wedge o_j.position = 2;$

PreUpdate:

$create\ o;$
 $s_i.a_k = v'_i;$
 $o_j.a_s = v'_j;$
 $s_i.R_to_select = UR_{Pre_UCON_A} - \{r_1\}$

Command— $r_2(s_i, o_j)$

PreCondition: $s_i.R_to_select = UR_{Pre_UCON_A} - \{r_1\} \wedge s_i.lock = 1$
 $\wedge s_i.position = 1 \wedge o_j.position = 2;$

PreUpdate:

$s_i.R_to_select = UR_{Pre_UCON_A} - \{r_1, r_2\}$
 \dots
 \dots

Command— $r_k(s_i, o_j)$

PreCondition: $s_i.R_to_select = \{r_k\} \wedge s_i.lock = 1 \wedge s_i.position = 1$
 $\wedge o_j.position = 2;$

PreUpdate:

$o_j.position = \phi$
 $s_i.R_to_select = \phi$

4- Release the lock from the first parameter (actor) of the RL-ABAM2 command.

```
Command release_lock (si : ATT(si), O_lock : ATT(O_lock))  
if si.type = ordinary ∧ O_lock.type = lock ∧ si.lock = 1 ∧ O_lock.lock = 0 ∧  
si.R_to_select =  $\phi$   
then  
  update attribute si.lock = 0;  
  update attribute O_lock.lock = 1;  
  update attribute si.position =  $\phi$ ; end
```

The study of ABAM indicates that a safe application of access rights could be based on the following principles:

- 1- Do not use rights in the if part of commands
- 2- Some rights could be left behind by commands so their next use is more efficient
- 3- There is a meaningful place for access matrix rights

Thank you!!
Any Questions??