

On the Expressive Power of the Unary Transformation Model

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Abstract. The Transformation Model (TRM) was recently introduced [10] in the literature by Sandhu and Ganta. TRM is based on the concept of *transformation of rights*. The propagation of access rights in TRM is authorized entirely by existing rights for the object in question. It has been demonstrated in the earlier work that TRM is useful for expressing various kinds of consistency, confidentiality, and integrity controls.

In our previous work [10], a special case of TRM named Binary Transformation Model (BTRM) was defined. We proved that BTRM is equivalent in expressive power to TRM. This result indicates that it suffices to allow testing for only two cells of the matrix.

In this paper we study the relationship between TRM and the Unary Transformation Model (UTRM). In UTRM, individual commands are restricted to testing for only one cell of the matrix (whereas individual TRM commands can test for multiple cells of the matrix). Contrary to our initial conjecture (of [10]), we found that TRM and UTRM are formally equivalent in terms of expressive power. The implications of this result on safety analysis is also discussed in this paper.

Keywords: Access Control, Access Rights, Authorization, Client-Server Architecture, Expressive Power.

1 Introduction

In this paper we analyze the expressive power of a family of access control models called transformation models [10]. These models are based on the concept of *transformation of rights*, which simply implies that the possession of rights for an object by subjects allows those subjects to obtain and lose rights for that object and also grant and revoke the rights (for that object) to other subjects. Hence, in these models, the propagation of access rights is authorized entirely by the existing rights for the object in question. (More generally, propagation could also be authorized by the existing rights for the source and destination subjects, for example, in models such as HRU [4] and TAM [8].) The concept of transformation of rights allows us to express a large variety of practical security policies encompassing various kinds of consistency, confidentiality and integrity controls.

The concept of transformation of access rights was introduced by Sandhu in [7]. Based on it the monotonic transform model [7] and its non-monotonic extension (NMT) [9] were proposed. The simplicity and expressive power of NMT is demonstrated in [9] by means of a number of examples. It was recently discovered by the authors that NMT cannot adequately implement the document release example given in [9]. The reason behind this is the limited testing power of NMT. This led us to the formulation of the Transformation Model (TRM). TRM substantially generalizes NMT.

TRM does have good expressive power (which NMT lacks). TRM can also be implemented efficiently [10] in a distributed environment using a typical client-server architecture. This is due to the fact that the propagation of access rights in TRM is authorized entirely by existing rights for the object in question. In typical implementations these rights would be represented in an access control list (ACL), stored with the object. The server responsible for managing that object will have immediate access to all the information (i.e., the ACL) required to make access control decisions with respect to that object. Moreover, the effect of propagation commands is also confined only to the ACL of that object.

The Binary Transformation Model (BTRM) was defined in [10]. BTRM is a simpler version of TRM in which testing can involve up to two cells of the matrix. It has been proven in [10] that BTRM is formally equivalent to TRM. (Two models are said to be equivalent in expressive power, if for every system in one model, there is an equivalent system in the other, and vice versa. For the purpose of this paper, we simplify the definition of equivalence of two systems to intuitively mean that two systems are equivalent if and only if both of them enforce the same policy). This also implies that it suffices to have systems that test for two cells of the matrix.

In this paper we study the relationship between TRM and the Unary Transformation Model (UTRM) defined in [10]. In UTRM the commands are authorized by checking for rights in a single cell of the access matrix. It has been conjectured in [10] that UTRM does not have the adequate expressive power to enforce simple policies like the document release example. On the contrary, we prove in this paper that UTRM is equivalent to TRM in terms of expressive power and hence UTRM can also enforce all the policies enforced by TRM (including the document release example). The equivalence of TRM and UTRM helps in concluding that the safety results of UTRM are in no way better than that of TRM.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief background of the Transformation Model (TRM). It also describes two models, UTRM and BTRM, which are restricted cases of TRM. In section 3 we first briefly describe the discussion of [10], which conjectured that UTRM is not adequate enough to express the document release example. We then prove that this is not the case by proving formally that UTRM is equivalent to TRM. We also discuss in section 3, the implications of this result on safety analysis. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper.

2 Background

In this section, we review the definition of the Transformation Model (TRM), which was introduced in [10]. Our review is necessarily brief. The motivation for developing TRM, and its relation to other access control models are discussed at length in [10]. Following the review of TRM we briefly review the definitions of UTRM and BTRM.

2.1 The Transformation Model

TRM is an access control model in which authorization for propagation of access rights is entirely based on existing rights for the object in question. As discussed in the introduction this leads to an efficient implementation of TRM in a distributed environment using a simple client-server architecture. The expressiveness of TRM is indicated in [10] by enforcing various kinds of consistency, confidentiality, and integrity controls.

The protection state in TRM can be viewed in terms of the familiar access matrix. There is a row for each subject in the system and a column for each object. In TRM, the subjects and objects are disjoint. TRM does not define any access rights for operations on subjects, which are assumed to be completely autonomous entities. The $[X, Y]$ cell contains rights which subject X possesses for object Y .

TRM consists of a small number of basic constructs and a language for specifying the commands which cause changes in the protection state. For each command, we have to specify the authorization required to execute that command, as well as the effect of the command on the protection state. We generally call such a specification as an *authorization scheme* (or simply scheme) [8].

A scheme in the TRM is defined by specifying the following components.

1. A set of access rights R .
2. Disjoint sets of subject and object types, TS and TO , respectively.
3. A collection of three classes of state changing commands: *transformation commands*, *create commands*, and *destroy commands*. Each individual command specifies the authorization for its execution, and the changes in the protection state effected by it.

The scheme is defined by the security administrator when the system is first set up and thereafter remains fixed. It should be kept in mind that TRM treats the security administrator as an external entity, rather than as another subject in the system. Each component of the scheme is discussed in turn below.

The Typed Access Matrix Model (TAM) [8] and TRM are strongly related. They differ in state changing commands. In TRM, propagation of access rights is authorized entirely by existing rights for the object in question, whereas in TAM this authorization can involve testing rights for multiple objects. TRM commands can only modify one column at a time, where as TAM can modify multiple columns of the matrix. TRM does allow testing for absence of rights,

while the original definition of TAM in [8] does not allow for such testing. If TAM is augmented with testing for absence of rights (as in [1]), it is then a generalization of TRM.

Rights

Each system has a set of rights, R . R is not specified in the model but varies from system to system. Generally R is expected to include the usual rights such as *own*, *read*, *write*, *append* and *execute*. However, this is not required by the model. We also expect R to generally include more complex rights, such as *review*, *pat-ok*, *grade-it*, *release*, *credit*, *debit*, etc. The meaning of these rights will be explained wherever they are used in our examples.

The access rights serve two purposes. First, the presence of a right, such as r , in the $[S, O]$ cell of the access matrix may authorize S to perform, say, the read operation on O . Secondly, the presence of a right, say o , or the absence of right o , in $[S, O]$ may authorize S to perform some operation which changes the access matrix, e.g., by entering r in $[S', O]$. The focus of TRM is on this second purpose of rights, i.e., the authorization by which the access matrix itself gets changed.

Types of Subjects and Objects

The notion of type is fundamental to TRM. All subjects and objects are assumed to be strongly typed. Strong typing requires that each subject or object is created to be of a particular type which thereafter does not change. The advantage of strong typing is that it groups together subjects and objects into classes (i.e., types) so that instances of the same type have the same properties with respect to the authorization scheme.

Strong typing is analogous to tranquility in the Bell-LaPadula style of security models [2], whereby security labels on subjects and objects cannot be changed. The adverse consequences of unrestrained non-tranquility are well known [3, 5, 6]. Similarly, non-tranquility with respect to types has adverse consequences for the safety problem [8].

TRM requires that a disjoint set of subject types, TS , and object types, TO , be specified in a scheme. For example, we might have $TS = \{user, security-officer\}$ and $TO = \{user-files, system-files\}$, with the significance of these types indicated by their names.

State Changing Commands

The protection state of the system is changed by means of TRM commands. The security administrator defines a finite set of commands when the system is specified. There are three types of state changing commands in the TRM, each of which is defined below.

Transformation Commands

We reiterate that every command in TRM has a condition which is on a single object and the primitive operations comprising the command are only on that object. In all the commands the last parameter in the command is the object which is being manipulated, and the first parameter is the subject who initiates the command.

A *transformation command* has the following format:

```

command  $\alpha(S_1 : s_1, S_2 : s_2, \dots, S_k : s_k, O : o_i)$ 
  if predicate then
     $op_1; op_2; \dots; op_n$ 
  end

```

The first line of the command states that α is the name of the command and S_1, S_2, \dots, S_k, O are the formal parameters. The formal parameters S_1, S_2, \dots, S_k are subjects and of types s_1, s_2, \dots, s_k . The **only** object formal parameter O is of type o_i and is the last parameter in the command.

The second line of the command α is the predicate and is called the *condition* of the command. The predicate consists of a boolean expression composed of the following terms connected by the usual boolean operators (such as \wedge and \vee):

$$r_i \in [S, O] \text{ or } r_i \notin [S, O]$$

Here r_i is a right in R , S can be substituted with any of the formal subject parameters S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n ; and O is the sole object parameter. Simply speaking the predicate tests for the presence and absence of some rights for subjects on object O . Given below are some examples of TRM predicates:

1. $approve \in [S_1, O] \wedge prepare \notin [S_2, O]$
2. $prepare \in [S, O] \wedge assign \in [S_1, O] \wedge creator \notin [S, O]$
3. $own \in [S, O] \vee write \in [S, O]$
4. $r_1 \in [S_1, O] \wedge (r_2 \in [S_1, O] \vee r_1 \in [S_2, O]) \wedge r_3 \in [S_2, O] \wedge r \in [S_3, O]$

If the condition is omitted, the command is said to be an *unconditional command*, otherwise it is said to be a *conditional command*.

The third line of the command consisting of sequence of operations $op_1; op_2; \dots; op_n$ is called the *body* of α . Each op_i is one of the following two primitive operations:

- **enter** r **into** $[S, O]$
- **delete** r **from** $[S, O]$

Here again, r_i is a right in R , S can be substituted with any of the formal subject parameters S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n ; and O is the sole object parameter. It is important to note that all the operations enter or delete rights for subjects on object O alone.

The **enter** operation enters a right $r \in R$ into an existing cell of the access matrix. The contents of the cell are treated as a set for this purpose, i.e., if

the right is already present, the cell is not changed. The **delete** operation has the opposite effect of **enter**. It (possibly) removes a right from a cell of the access matrix. Since each cell is treated as a set, **delete** has no effect if the deleted right does not already exist in the cell. The **enter** operation is said to be *monotonic* because it only adds and does not remove from the access matrix. Because **delete** removes from the access matrix it is said to be a *non-monotonic* operation.

A command is invoked by substituting actual parameters of the appropriate types for the formal parameters. The condition part of the command is evaluated with respect to its actual parameters. The body is executed only if the condition evaluates to true.

Some examples of transformation commands are given below.

```
command transfer-ownership ( $S_1 : s, S_2 : s, O : o$ )
  if own  $\in [S_1, O]$  then
    enter own in  $[S_2, O]$ 
    delete own from  $[S_1, O]$ 
  end
```

```
command grade ( $S_1 : professor, S_2 : student, O : project$ )
  if own  $\in [S_2, O] \wedge grade \in [S_1, O]$  then
    enter good in  $[S_2, O]$ 
    delete grade from  $[S_1, O]$ 
  end
```

```
command issue-check ( $S_1 : clerk, O : voucher$ )
  if prepare  $\notin [S_1, O] \wedge approve \notin [S_1, O]$  then
    enter issue in  $[S_1, O]$ 
  end
```

Command *transfer-ownership* transfers the ownership of a file from one subject to another. In the command *grade*, the professor gives right *good* to the student's project. In command *issue-check*, a clerk gets an *issue* right only if he/she is not the one who prepared and approved it.

Create Commands

A *create command* is an unconditional command. The creator of an object gets some rights for the created object like *own*, *read*, etc., as specified in the body of the command. No subject other than the creator will get rights to the created object in the create command. Subjects other than the creator can subsequently acquire rights for the object via transformation commands. In short, the effect of a create command is to introduce a new column in the matrix with some new rights for the subject who created it.

A typical create command is given below.

```

command create( $S_1 : s_1, O : o_i$ )
  create object  $O$ 
  enter own in  $[S_1, O]$ 
end

```

In the general case the body of the command may enter any set of rights in the $[S_1, O]$ cell.

A create command is necessarily an unconditional command as the command cannot check for rights on an object which does not exist, and TRM commands do not allow testing for rights on objects other than the object which is being created. The create object operation requires that the object being created have a unique identity different from all other objects. A create command is monotonic.

Destroy Commands

A *destroy command* is in general, a conditional command. The effect of a destroy command on the matrix will be removal of the corresponding column from the access matrix. A typical destroy command is given below.

```

command destroy( $S_1 : s_1, O : o_i$ )
  if own  $\in [S_1, O]$  then
    destroy object  $O$ 
  end

```

In this case the condition ensures that only the owner can destroy the object. More generally, deletion can be authorized by some combination of rights possessed by the destroyer. A destroy command is non-monotonic.

Summary of TRM

To summarize, a system is specified in TRM by defining the following finite components.

1. A set of rights R .
2. A set of disjoint subject and object types TS and TO respectively.
3. A set of state-changing transformation, creation and destroy commands.
4. The initial state.

We say that the rights, types and commands define the system *scheme*. Note that once the system scheme is specified by the security administrator it remains fixed thereafter for the life of the system. The system state, however, changes with time.

2.2 The Unary Transformation Model (UTRM)

The Unary Transformation Model is a simpler version of TRM in which testing in a command can be on only one cell of the matrix. A UTRM predicate consists of a boolean expression composed of the following terms:

$$r_i \in [S_j, O] \text{ or } r_i \notin [S_j, O]$$

where r_i is a right in R and S_j can be any one of the formal subject parameters, but all the terms in the expression must have the same S_j . In other words, the predicate tests for the presence and absence of rights for a single subject S_j on object O . Usually S_j will be the first parameter in the command, since that is the one who initiates the command.

UTRM generalizes the model called NMT (for Non-Monotonic Transform) [9]. The transformation commands in NMT, viz., grant transformation and internal transformation, are easily expressed as UTRM commands (as they test for rights in one cell of the matrix). NMT is a restricted version of UTRM as the state changing commands in NMT test only one cell and modify at most two cells.

2.3 The Binary Transformation Model (BTRM)

The Binary Transformation Model is also a simpler version of TRM in which testing in a command can involve up to two cells of the matrix. A BTRM predicate consists of a boolean expression composed of the following terms:

$$r_i \in [S_j, O] \text{ or } r_i \notin [S_j, O]$$

where r_i is a right in R and S_j can be any one of the formal subject parameters, but the expression can have at most two different S_j 's from the given parameters. In other words, the predicate tests for the presence and absence of rights for at most two subjects (on object O). One of the S_j 's will typically be the first parameter which is the initiator of the command.

3 Expressive Power of UTRM

In this section we first briefly look at the discussion given in [10], which conjectured that UTRM cannot adequately enforce the document release example. We then prove that the conjecture is wrong by formally proving that UTRM is equivalent to TRM. The equivalence of TRM and UTRM indicates that UTRM can enforce all the policies enforced by TRM (including the document release example). We also discuss the implications of the equivalence result on safety analysis.

3.1 Document Release Example

In this subsection we will take a brief look at the discussion given in [10] which conjectured that UTRM cannot adequately enforce the document release example.

Consider the document release example discussed in [9]. In this example, a scientist creates a document and hence gets *own*, *read* and *write* rights to it. After preparing the document for publication, the scientist asks for a review from a patent officer. In the process, the scientist loses the *write* right to the document, since it is clearly undesirable for a document to be edited during or after a (successful) review. After review of the document, the patent officer grants the scientist an approval. It is reasonable to disallow further attempts to review the document after an approval is granted. Thus the *review* right for the document is lost as approval is granted. After obtaining approval from the patent officer, the scientist can publish the document by getting a *release* right for the document. (The problem discussed in [9] also requires approval by a security officer prior to document release, but that aspect of the problem is not germane to the discussion here.)

To express this policy, we employ the following rights and types:

- $R = \{own, read, write, review, pat-ok, pat-reject, release\}$
- $TS = \{sci, po\}$, $TO = \{doc\}$

The *own*, *read*, and *write* rights have their usual meaning. The other rights correspond to stages in the approval process. The right *review* lets a patent officer review a document; *pat-ok* is the right that is returned if the patent review is satisfactory otherwise *pat-reject* is returned; and *release* authorizes release of the document. Subject types *sci* and *po* are abbreviations for scientists and patent officers respectively, and there is a single object type *doc*.

The following TRM (or more precisely BTRM) commands enforce the desired policy:

```

command create-doc( $S : sci, O : doc$ )
  create object  $O$ 
  enter own in [ $S, O$ ]
  enter read in [ $S, O$ ]
  enter write in [ $S, O$ ]
end
command rqst-review( $S : sci, P : po, O : doc$ )
if  $own \in [S, O] \wedge write \in [S, O]$  then
  enter review in [ $P, O$ ]
  delete write from [ $S, O$ ]
end
command get-approval( $S : sci, P : po, O : doc$ )
if  $review \in [P, O] \wedge own \in [S, O]$  then
  enter pat-ok in [ $S, O$ ]
  delete review from [ $P, O$ ]
end

```

```

command get-rejection( $S : sci, P : po, O : doc$ )
if  $review \in [P, O] \wedge own \in [S, O]$  then
    enter pat-reject in  $[S, O]$ 
    delete review from  $[P, O]$ 
end
command release-doc( $S : sci, O : doc$ )
if  $pat-ok \in [S, O]$  then
    enter release in  $[S, O]$ 
    delete pat-ok from  $[S, O]$ 
end
command revise-doc( $S : sci, O : doc$ )
if  $pat-reject \in [S, O]$  then
    enter write in  $[S, O]$ 
    delete pat-reject from  $[S, O]$ 
end

```

The scientist creates a document using the command *create-doc*. After preparing the document the scientist asks the patent officer to review it through command *reqst-review*. The scientist gets approval to release through command *get-approval* or a rejection via *get-rejection*. In the former case the scientist gets the *release* permission by means of the command *release-doc*. In the latter case the scientist gets the *write* permission by means of the command *revise-doc* so as to revise the document if appropriate.

We now discuss why UTRM cannot adequately express the document release example. All the commands, except *get-approval* and *get-rejection*, are UTRM commands. The commands *get-approval* and *get-rejection* are BTRM commands as they test two cells.

The *get-approval* command tests for rights in two cells of the matrix. More specifically, it tests if the patent officer has the *review* right for the document and if the scientist is the owner of the document. If this condition is satisfied the command gives the right, *pat-ok*, to the owner.

If the *get-approval* command does not test for the *own* right, then the command might give the *pat-ok* right to some other scientist who is not a owner. The system will then halt in an unwanted state as the scientist who creates the document cannot get the *release* right for it. This is due to the fact that the scientist cannot request a second review prior to receiving a response for the first one (this is achieved by conditioning the request for review on presence of the *write* right, which is then removed until a rejection is received). At the same time, the patent officer can give the *pat-ok* only once to one scientist (as the patent officer loses the *review* right in this process). Therefore if the patent officer gives the right *pat-ok* to a scientist who is not owner, the actual owner cannot get the *release* right and the system halts in an unwanted state.

If the *get-approval* command does not test for the *review* right then a patent officer can grant *pat-ok* for documents which the scientist can still write. Moreover, this can be done whether or not a request for review has been made. The danger of this approach is obvious. But then the required policy cannot be

conveniently enforced by UTRM. Note that similar considerations apply to the *get-rejection* command.

In short, to enforce the document release example, it appears that there is a need for commands which test for two cells of the matrix. Since UTRM (and NMT lack) such commands, they cannot conveniently express the document release example.

The discussion above (of [10]) argues informally that UTRM is inadequate to express the document release example. On the contrary, we formally prove in the next subsection, the equivalence of UTRM and TRM, which implies that UTRM can also enforce all the policies enforced by TRM (including the document release example).

3.2 Equivalence of TRM and UTRM

We now analyze the relative expressive power of TRM and UTRM. TRM and UTRM are said to be equivalent in expressive power, if for every scheme in TRM, there is an equivalent scheme in UTRM, and vice versa. For the purpose of this paper, we simplify the definition of equivalence of two systems to intuitively mean that two systems are equivalent if and only if both of them enforce the same policy.

Recall that UTRM is a restricted version of TRM. It is the same as TRM except that the testing in a command can only be on a single cell. It has been proven in [10] that TRM is equivalent to BTRM with just three parameters. Thus to prove the equivalence of TRM and UTRM, it is sufficient to show that for every BTRM scheme with three parameters, there exists an equivalent UTRM scheme.

We will now show how any given BTRM command can be simulated by multiple UTRM commands. The Boolean condition of any BTRM command, say Y , can be converted into the familiar *disjunctive normal form* which consists of a disjunction (i.e., \vee) of *minterms*. Each minterm is a conjunction (i.e., \wedge) of primitive terms of the form $r_i \in [S_i, O]$ or $r_i \notin [S_i, O]$. The command Y can then be factored into multiple commands, each of which has one minterm as its condition and the original body of Y as its body. Hence, we can assume without loss of generality that the predicate of every BTRM command consists of a conjunction of primitive terms.


We will illustrate the construction by simulating a BTRM command X (which has three parameters) of the following format.

```

command  $X(S_1 : t_1, S_2 : t_2, O : o)$ 
if  $P_1 \wedge P_2$  then
    operations in  $[S_1, O]$ 
    operations in  $[S_2, O]$ 
end

```

In the above command, each P_i is itself composed of a conjunction of terms $r_j \in [S_i, O]$ or $r_j \notin [S_i, O]$, where $r_j \in \mathbb{R}$. Intuitively P_i tests for the presence



(a) Initial state of BTRM (b) Initial state of UTRM

Fig. 1. UTRM simulation of command X

of, and absence of some rights in the single cell $[S_i, O]$. In the body of command X , the phrase “**operations** in $[S_i, O]$ ” denotes a sequence of enter and delete (or possibly empty) operations in the $[S_i, O]$ cell. Note that the types t_1 and t_2 need not be distinct. The formal parameters S_1, S_2 must of course be distinct, but the actual parameters used on a particular invocation of this command may have repeated parameters as allowed by parameter types. For ease of exposition, we will initially assume that the actual parameters S_1 and S_2 are distinct. The simulation of a BTRM command with repeated parameters, will be explained at the end of this section.

We now consider how the BTRM command X can be simulated by several UTRM commands. As X tests two cells, it is obvious that the simulation of X cannot be a single UTRM command. Since UTRM can test for only one cell, the simulation of X must be done by multiple commands in the UTRM system. The key to doing this successfully is to prevent other UTRM commands from interfering with the simulation of the given BTRM command, X . The simplest way to do this is to ensure that BTRM commands can be executed in the UTRM simulation only one at a time. To do this we need to synchronize the execution of successive BTRM commands in the UTRM simulation.

This synchronization is achieved by introducing an extra subject called *Lock* of type *lock*, and an extra right, L . The role of *Lock* is to sequentialize the execution of simulation of BTRM commands in the UTRM system. The type *lock* is assumed, without loss of generality, to be distinct from any type in the given BTRM system.

Also the initial state of the UTRM system is modified in such a way that every subject of the BTRM system is given a different type. This assumption is acceptable within the framework of these models, because the number of subjects in the system is static (as there is no creation and destruction of subjects in Transformation Models). If the initial state of the BTRM system resembles figure 1(a), then in our construction the initial state of the UTRM system resembles figure 1(b). The α_i 's are sets of rights in the indicated cell.

The UTRM simulation of X proceeds in five phases as indicated in figure 2 and 3. In these figures we show only the relevant portion of the access matrix, and only those rights introduced specifically for the UTRM simulation. Hence, for clarity of the diagram, we do not show the α_i 's rights, but these are intended

to be present. Since the focus in TRM is on a single object, the matrix reduces to a single column for that object.

The objective of the first phase is to make sure that no other UTRM command corresponding to another BTRM command can execute (on object O) until the simulation of X is complete. The first phase also ensures that the actual parameters of the UTRM commands are tied to the actual parameters of the BTRM command. In the second phase, if P_1 part of the condition of X is true, then that fact is indicated to all the subjects in the system. If P_1 is false, the second phase indicates the failure of the condition of X by entering right *cleanX* in $[Lock, O]$. In the third phase, if the condition of X is true, then the body of X is partly executed. If the condition of X is false, the third phase also indicates the failure of the condition of X . In the fourth phase, the rest of the body of X is executed. And finally the fifth phase removes all the additional bookkeeping rights and also indicates that the simulation of X is complete. Each of the phases and the commands used are explained briefly below.

The UTRM command *X-1-invocation* corresponds to phase I. It checks for right L in $[Lock, O]$, and if present deletes it, to make sure that no other UTRM command (simulating some other BTRM command) can execute (on object O) until the simulation of X is complete. It also makes sure that the actual parameters of X are used in the simulation by entering rights p_1, p_2 in cells $[S_1, O]$ and $[S_2, O]$ respectively. It also enters the right X in cells $[S_1, O], [S_2, O]$ to indicate that the simulation of X is currently in progress. The matrix, after the execution of command *X-1-invocation* resembles figure 2(a). To simulate X , we need a different *X-i-invocation* command for each distinct combination of a subject of type t_1 and a subject of type t_2 . For example, if there are m subjects of type t_1 and n subjects of type t_2 in the BTRM system, then in phase I, the simulation of command X requires mn commands in the UTRM system. Phase I command simulating X with actual parameters corresponding to types s_1 and s_2 respectively is given below.

```

command X-1-invocation( $S_1 : s_1, S_2 : s_2, Lock : L, O : o$ )
if  $L \in [Lock, O]$  then
    delete  $L$  from  $[Lock, O]$ 
    enter  $p_1$  in  $[S_1, O]$ 
    enter  $p_2$  in  $[S_2, O]$ 
    enter  $X$  in  $[S_1, O]$ 
    enter  $X$  in  $[S_2, O]$ 
end

```

In phase II, the commands test if the P_1 part of the condition of X is true. If so, the command *X-2-successful* gives the right P_1^* to all the subjects (to indicate that P_1 is true). The matrix at the end of successful phase II, resembles figure 2(b). If P_1 is false, the command *X-2-fail* enters the right *cleanX* in $[Lock, O]$ to indicate that the condition of command X is false. The right *cleanX* in $[lock, O]$ also indicates that simulation has reached the final phase. In this case, the matrix at the end of failed phase II, resembles figure 3(a). It is important




Fig. 2. UTRM simulation of the authorized BTRM command *X*




Fig. 3. UTRM simulation of unauthorized BTRM command *X*

to note that in phase II, only one of *X-2-fail* or *X-2-successful* can execute. To simulate *X*, we need a different *X-2-successful* command for each subject of type *t*₁ and a different *X-2-fail* command for each subject of type *t*₁. Phase II commands simulating *X* with actual parameters corresponding to types *s*₁ and *s*₂ respectively, are given below.

```

command X-2-successful(S1 : s1, S2 : s2, S3 : s3, ..., Sn : sn, Lock : L, O :
o)
if p1 ∈ [S1, O] ∧ P1 ∧ X ∈ [S1, O] then
    enter P1* in [S1, O]
    ...
    enter P1* in [Sn, O]
end
command X-2-fail(S1 : s1, Lock : L, O : o)
if p1 ∈ [S1, O] ∧ ¬P1 ∧ X ∈ [S1, O] then
    enter cleanX in [Lock, O]
end
    
```

Note that these are valid UTRM commands because all tests in the condition part are in the $[S_1, O]$ cell.

In phase III, the rest of the condition of X is tested in X -3-*successful*. If the condition is true, part of the body of X is executed. The matrix at the end of successful phase III, resembles figure 2(c). If the condition is not true, the command X -3-*fail* enters the right *cleanX* in $[Lock, O]$ to indicate that the simulation of X has failed. In this case the matrix at the end of phase III, resembles figure 3(b). It is important to note that in phase III, only one of X -3-*fail* or X -3-*successful* can execute. Here also to simulate X , we need a different X -3-*successful* command for each subject of type t_2 and a different X -3-*fail* command for each subject of type t_2 . Phase III commands simulating X with actual parameters corresponding to types s_1 and s_2 respectively, are given below.

```

command  $X$ -3-successful( $S_1 : s_1, S_2 : s_2, \dots, S_n : s_n, Lock : L, O : o$ )
if  $p_2 \in [S_2, O] \wedge P_1^* \in [S_2, O] \wedge P_2 \wedge X \in [S_2, O]$  then
    operations in  $[S_2, O]$ 
    enter  $P_2^*$  in  $[S_1, O]$ 
    ...
    enter  $P_2^*$  in  $[S_n, O]$ 
end
command  $X$ -3-fail( $S_2 : s_2, Lock : L, O : o$ )
if  $p_2 \in [S_2, O] \wedge \neg P_2 \wedge X \in [S_2, O]$  then
    enter cleanX in  $[Lock, O]$ 
end

```

In the fourth phase, the rest of the body of X is executed. Also right *cleanX* is entered in $[lock, O]$ also indicate that simulation has reached the final phase. It is also important to note that the phase IV command is executed only if the commands executed in phases II and III are successful commands. The matrix at the end of phase IV resembles figure 2(d). Here also to simulate X , we need a different X -4-*successful* command for each subject of type t_1 . Phase IV commands simulating X with actual parameters corresponding to types s_1 and s_2 respectively, are given below.

```

command  $X$ -4-successful( $S_1 : s_1, Lock : L, O : o$ )
if  $p_1 \in [S_1, O] \wedge P_2^* \in [S_1, O] \wedge X \in [S_1, O]$  then
    operations in  $[S_1, O]$ 
    enter cleanX in  $[Lock, O]$ 
end

```

In the final phase, all the bookkeeping rights $R^* = \{p_1, p_2, X, P_1^*, P_2^*, \text{cleanX}\}$ are deleted. Also right L is entered back into $[Lock, O]$ to indicate that the simulation of X is complete and the simulation of some other BTRM command (on object O) can now begin. The matrix after the final phase, resembles figure 1(b). The phase V command to simulate X is given below.

```

command  $X$ -5-complete( $S_1 : s_1, S_2 : s_2, S_3 : s_3, \dots, S_n : S_n, Lock : L, O : o$ )
if  $cleanX \in [Lock, O]$  then
    delete  $R^*$  from  $[S_1, O]$ 
    ...
    delete  $R^*$  from  $[S_n, O]$ 
    delete  $cleanX$  from  $[Lock, O]$ 
    enter  $L$  in  $[Lock, O]$ 
end

```

The important thing to be noted from our construction is that once the UTRM simulation of command X proceeds with some actual parameters in phase I, then in all other phases, the commands execute with the same parameters.

We have shown how a BTRM command X , can be simulated by UTRM commands. The command X has actual parameters (S_1, S_2) which are distinct (as they are of types t_1 and t_2). A BTRM command can also have actual parameters which are repeated. This is possible if the command has two parameters of the same type. Our construction can be easily extended to simulate such commands. For example, if the BTRM command X has both the subject parameters of type t_1 , then the following type of commands are needed **along** with the five phases of commands explained before. The command X -1-invocation-repeated will make sure that the two actual subject parameters of X are same and the command X -repeated-done does the necessary operations (if the two actual subject parameters of X are same). If there are m subjects of type t_1 in the BTRM system, then we need to give m X -1-invocation-repeated commands and m X -repeated-done commands. The UTRM commands simulating X with repeated actual parameters corresponding to type s_1 are given below.

```

command  $X$ -1-invocation-repeated( $S_1 : s_1, Lock; L, O : o$ )
if  $L \in [Lock, O]$  then
    delete  $L$  from  $[Lock, O]$ 
    enter  $p_1$  in  $[S_1, O]$ 
    enter  $p_2$  in  $[S_1, O]$ 
    enter  $X$  in  $[S_1, O]$ 
end
command  $X$ -repeated-done( $S_1 : s_1, Lock; L, O : o$ )
if  $X \in [Lock, O] \wedge p_1 \in [S_1, O] \wedge p_2 \in [S_1, O] \wedge P_1 \wedge P_2$  then
    operations in  $[S_1, O]$ 
    enter  $cleanX$  in  $[Lock, O]$ 
end

```

A proof sketch for the correctness of the construction is given below.

Theorem 1. *For every BTRM system β_1 , the construction outlined above produces an equivalent UTRM system β_2 .*

Proof Sketch: It is easy to see that any reachable state in β_1 can be reached in β_2 by simulating each BTRM command by UTRM commands, as discussed

above. Conversely any reachable state in β_2 , with $L \in [LOCK, O]$, will correspond to a reachable state in β_1 . A reachable state in β_2 , with $L \notin [LOCK, O]$ and which passes phase III, will correspond to a state in β_1 where one BTRM command has been partially completed. A state in β_2 , with $L \notin [LOCK, O]$ and which fails the testing phase, will then lead β_2 to a previous state where $L \in [LOCK, O]$, which is reachable in β_1 . Our construction also ensures that once the UTRM simulation passes the first phase, then the simulation proceeds with the same actual parameters of the first phase. Hence the above construction proves the equivalence of TRM and UTRM. A formal inductive proof can be easily given, but is omitted for lack of space.

Discussion

The construction given in this section illustrates that TRM and UTRM are equivalent in terms of expressive power. (The discussion of [10] given earlier in this section indicates that this result is not obvious). The construction also indicates how the document release example can be enforced in UTRM (as the document release example given in this section has BTRM commands, and our construction gives multiple UTRM commands to simulate those BTRM commands. The UTRM system obtained from our construction also assumes that all the subjects are each of a different type). The UTRM scheme to enforce the document release example is not given in this paper due to lack of space. We can also extend the construction given in this paper to prove that NMT augmented with testing for absence of rights is equivalent to TRM. We have omitted it due to lack of space.

The equivalence of TRM and UTRM would imply that the safety results of UTRM are not any better than TRM. As TRM does not have any efficient non-monotonic safety results, neither would UTRM. This leads to the fact that it is difficult to have a model which can express some simple policies and at the same time have efficient non-monotonic safety results.

4 Conclusion

In this paper we have shown that the Transformation Model (TRM) [10] and the Unary Transformation Model (UTRM) [10] are formally equivalent in expressive power. The equivalence of TRM and UTRM would imply that the safety results of UTRM are not any better than TRM. The fact that TRM does not yet have any efficient non-monotonic safety results indicates that it is difficult to have a model which can express some simple policies and at the same time have efficient non-monotonic safety results.

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